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Local Control of the Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals 
Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service 
Robert M. Howard 
David C. Nixon 
ABSTRACT 
Recent studies show that the IRS is subject to some political 
control in shifting its policy between competing ideological or 
partisan concerns. We extend these studies to examine regional court 
influence over IRS audit policy within the separation of powers 
(“SOP”) framework. Examining cross-sectional time series data from 
1960 until 1988, we found that the IRS shifts the number of audits it 
conducts of businesses versus individuals in response to the 
prevailing median ideology of the federal courts of appeals, and in 
response to the prevailing ideological framework of the President and 
Congress. As the median federal court of appeals judge in a circuit 
becomes more liberal, the IRS conducts more audits of businesses 
located in that region. As the median federal court of appeals judge in 
a circuit becomes more conservative, the IRS conducts more audits of 
individuals living in that region. Courts, therefore, provide an 
additional measure of control over bureaucratic behavior. The 
different ideologies of the various courts of appeals provide an 
explanation for regional variation in IRS policy. 
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I. REGIONAL COURT INFLUENCE OVER BUREAUCRATIC 
POLICYMAKING: COURTS, IDEOLOGICAL PREFERENCES, AND THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
Many scholars have empirically demonstrated institutional 
constraints on bureaucratic behavior.1 These studies show that this 
“headless fourth branch of government”2 is in fact subject to 
democratic control.3 Most studies examine national control of 
bureaucracy, and posit that agency officials carry out the policy 
choices of the President, Congress, or, to some extent, the Supreme 
Court.4 Recently, several studies extended this national perspective, 
focusing on regional judicial control of bureaucratic behavior.5 Using 
various measures of partisanship or ideology, these studies indicated 
that national agency policy changed as the federal district courts’ or 
federal courts of appeals’s partisanship or ideologies changed.6 
However, current research leaves key questions unanswered. 
Although studies show that agencies are subject to political control 
by the branches of government,7 how agencies respond to competing 
legislative and executive control has yet to be determined. An 
agency, subordinate to the other branches of government, cannot 
achieve all of the policy goals of the President. Instead, the agency 
 
 1. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON 
ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989). 
 2. Robert E. Cushman, The Problem of Independent Regulatory Commission, CD. C. 
GPO (1937). 
 3. See infra notes 4 and 5. 
 4. See, e.g., B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE 
ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY (1994); Randall Calvert et al., A Theory of Political 
Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588 (1989); Terry M. Moe, Control and 
Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094 (1985) 
[hereinafter Control and Feedback]; Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential 
Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197 (1982) [hereinafter Regulatory Performance]; B. Dan 
Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation, 37 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 497 (1993) [hereinafter Dynamics]. 
 5. See, e.g., Robert M. Howard, Litigation, Courts, and Bureaucratic Policy: Equity, 
Efficiency and the Internal Revenue Service, 30 AM. POL. RES. 583 (2002); Robert M. Howard 
& David C. Nixon, Regional Influence Our Bureaucratic Policymaking: Courts, Ideological 
Preferences, and the Internal Revenue Service, 55 POL. RES. Q. 907 (2002); Evan J. Ringquist 
& Craig F. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published and Unpublished Decisions: The Case 
of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7 (1999). 
 6. See supra note 5. 
 7. See supra notes 1 and 4. 
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must strategically interact with the other institutions of national 
government and settle for the best possible policy outcome in our 
SOP framework. Additionally, one must ascertain how an agency 
responds to regional, as opposed to national, court control within this 
framework. Finally, one must determine if existing studies used 
appropriate ideological measures of the policy preferences of regional 
courts. This Article attempts to answer these questions by analyzing 
and testing the influence of variation in the ideology of federal courts 
of appeals on the audit behavior and policy of the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”). 
The IRS provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate the 
usefulness of a regional approach to bureaucratic research. Given the 
importance and pervasiveness of tax laws and tax policy, one would 
expect the IRS to implement policy based on the competing concerns 
of the three national branches of government. However, many 
citizens, scholars, journalists, and officials claim that the IRS does 
not carry out the policy wishes of the President and ignores 
congressional and court control.8 They point to the significant 
regional variation in IRS policy, arguing that there is little 
consistency in audits or audit policy.9  
An examination of IRS audit data provides some reinforcement 
for the view that the IRS treats taxpayers inconsistently.10 The IRS 
has sixty-three district offices in four national regions, all of which 
exhibit significant variation in audit rates.11 While some variation is 
to be expected, popular accounts seem to suggest that the variation is 
somehow evidence that either the national or regional government 
 
 8. See, e.g., DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS AND THE IRS 
(1989); SUSAN B. LONG, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: MEASURING TAX OFFENSES AND 
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE (1980); Elizabeth MacDonald, How the IRS Targets You, MONEY, 
Aug. 1994, at 132-39. 
 9. MacDonald, supra note 8, at 134-35. 
 10. See John T. Scholz & B. Dan Wood, Efficiency, Equity, and Politics: Democratic 
Control Over the Tax Collector, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI 1166, 1176-79 (1999) [hereinafter 
Efficiency, Equity, and Politics]. 
 11. See McDonald, supra note 8, at 134. A citizen of Nevada, which has a statewide audit 
rate of 1.76%, is seven times more likely to be audited as a citizen of Wisconsin, which has a 
statewide audit rate of 0.24%. A citizen of the Middle Atlantic region has a 20% greater 
probability of getting audited than a citizen of the Midwest. Id.; Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse, available at http://trac.syr.edu/data/irs/help/irsdistlist.html. 
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lacks political control over the IRS.12 
We argue that the IRS operates in a manner similar to other 
agencies and that identifiable political pressures on the agency induce 
variations in audits rates. One explanation for these variations is the 
differing ideologies and policy preferences of the various federal 
courts of appeals. Federal courts often interact with the IRS in a 
regionally specific manner, mainly at the appellate level.13 The 
appellate court level is an important and appropriate forum to 
examine federal court influence over IRS policy. This Article 
investigates the state-level variation in audit rates of businesses 
versus individual taxpayers from 1960 to 1988.14 Specifically, we 
examine whether variation in policy preferences of federal courts of 
appeals generates variation in audit policies. 
II. BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
The bureaucratic literature emphasizes the rational, internal, goal-
seeking nature of bureaucracy.15 Agencies allegedly develop goals 
independent of elected officials’ goals. Broad political goals such as 
service, fairness, justice, and equity often lose out to the parochial 
goals that agencies develop. Agencies with enforcement 
responsibility often have incentive to focus on legally sound, but 
politically trivial, goals in order to augment their perceived 
successes.16  
 
 12. See MacDonald, supra note 8. 
 13. I.R.C. § 7482 (2002); See also MARSHALL W. TAYLOR ET AL., TAX COURT PRACTICE 
(1990). In 1997, federal appellate courts handled 248 civil tax appeals from plaintiffs. Annual 
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (GPO 1997). In contrast, 
the Supreme Court handled only 166 federal tax cases between 1946 and 2001. LEE EPSTEIN ET 
AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 678 (3d ed. 2003). 
 14. We chose state variation over regional variation because state-level data has been 
much more stable over this period of time. See John T. Scholz & B. Dan Wood, Controlling the 
IRS: Principals, Principles, and Public Administration, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 141, 148 (1998) 
[hereinafter Controlling the IRS]. 
 15. See, e.g., FIORINA, supra note 1; WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., TAMING THE 
BUREAUCRACY: MUSCLES, PRAYERS, AND OTHER STRATEGIES (1989); WILLIAM A. 
NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); AARON 
WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (2d ed. 1992); JAMES Q. 
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989). 
 16. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Federal Trade Commission, in THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATION (James Q. Wilson, ed., 1980). For example, for police and prosecutors, compiling 
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Many argue that the IRS follows this pattern and often exceeds 
other agencies in disdain for broad political and social goals.17 Martin 
Shapiro observed that the IRS’s goal of maximum tax yield could 
subvert a broad tax policy aim of equity and fairness.18 Susan Long19 
and others20 contend that the IRS has goals, such as maximizing 
revenue, that are independent of justice and fairness. Elizabeth 
MacDonald asserts that the IRS rewards with larger budgets those 
regions and districts that collect the most in revenue.21 Congressional 
hearings in the mid-1990s, corroborate many of these assertions; 
witnesses testified that IRS agents engaged in arbitrary and 
capricious behavior during both audit and post-audit activity.22 
However, despite assertions of an agency “out of control,” recent 
events and studies show the IRS is politically responsive.23 Well-
publicized congressional hearings on IRS abuse of taxpayers have led 
to IRS internal audits, firings in district offices, and promises of 
reform by both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the 
IRS.24 In response to allegations of IRS abuse, Congress passed the 
“Taxpayer Bill of Rights.”25 Included in the law is a change in the 
burden of proof for audit disputes so the burden rests with the IRS 
rather than with the taxpayer.26  
 
arrest and conviction records becomes more important than efficiency, fairness, or the 
administration of justice, because arrests and convictions lead to greater prestige and larger 
budgets. 
 17. See, e.g., BURNHAM, supra note 8, at 226-54; HOLMES F. CROUCH, GOING INTO TAX 
COURT: TRY HARD; BE ALERT, IT’S A STACKED DECK (1993); LONG, supra note 8, at 131-48; 
MARTIN A. SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS (1988); PAUL N. STRASSELS, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE 
IRS: A TAXPAYERS GUIDE (1979). 
 18. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 107-27.  
 19. LONG, supra note 8, at 131-48. 
 20. See BURNHAN, supra note 8, at 226-54. 
 21. MacDonald, supra note 8, at 136. 
 22. See Hearings on H.R. 2337 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th 
Cong. 506 (1996). 
 23. See Controlling the IRS, supra note 14; Efficiency, Equity, and Politics, supra note 10. 
 24. David E. Rosenbaum, Internal Audit Confirms Abusive I.R.S. Practices, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 14, 1998, at A15. 
 25. Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996). 
 26. Id. See also Paul Wiseman, House Set to Vote Today on Overhaul of Tax Agency, 
USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 1997, at A17; Richard W. Stevenson, G.O.P. Chief Aims to Shift Burden 
in IRS Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, at A1. 
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In a recent study, John Scholz and Dan Wood show that the IRS 
changes its business to individual audit ratio in response to political 
change.27 Using a multivariate analysis, the authors used several state 
and federal political control variables to examine the impact of 
partisanship change and change in political control on audit ratios.28 
The study indicated that changes in presidential administrations and 
congressional committee membership spurred changes in IRS 
audits.29 In a later study, Scholz and Wood show that federal and 
state partisan composition also affects audit rates.30 Additionally, 
Robert Howard, individually,31 and with David Nixon32 observed IRS 
responsiveness to regional courts, indicating that regional variations 
in audit policy are partially explained by ideological differences in 
these courts.33 
These studies support previous empirical examinations of 
bureaucratic control by the federal executive and legislative 
branches.34 However, none of these studies examined how agencies 
carry out regionally specific policy when also subjected to pressure 
from the executive and legislative branches, or the relative degree to 
which regional courts affect agency policy. In addition, all studies of 
lower courts have relied on, at best, imperfect measures of judicial 
ideology. In the following sections, we address these concerns by 
offering a model of how agencies may respond to federal regional 
courts and the federal executive and legislative branches. 
 
 27. Controlling the IRS, supra note 14. 
 28. Id. at 148-54. 
 29. Id. at 155-57. President Reagan’s election, for example, led to an increase in 
individual audits and a decrease in corporate audits. Id. 
 30. Efficiency, Equity, and Politics, supra note 10. The study indicated that Republicans 
initially sought efficiency over tax fairness or equity, and Democrats favored equity. Id. 
 31. Howard, supra note 5.  
 32. Howard & Nixon, supra note 5. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Calvert et al., supra note 4; Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
165 (1984); Regulatory Performance, supra note 4; Control and Feedback, supra note 4; 
Dynamics, supra note 4. 
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III. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND BUREAUCRATIC POLICYMAKING 
We premise our argument on an SOP model and examine the 
actions of regional directors and their ability to adjust the number of 
audits conducted in each district to most effectively carry out the 
President’s preferred policy.35  
The SOP model formalizes the mechanics of the American 
legislative process, thus specifying the primary dynamics of 
bureaucratic control. The SOP model suggests that a “core,” or, 
“uncovered set” of legislative and presidential preferences constrain 
certain agency policy choices, but that agencies are otherwise 
relatively free to propose and implement policies as they see fit.36 
Thus, in a single liberal-conservative dimension, agencies may 
propose any policy within a “legislative-executive core,” and that 
policy will not be overturned through statutory means.37 Thus much 
of the “control” over agencies operates implicitly—agencies choose 
policies in order to avoid legislative reversals, because an agency 
policy outside the legislative-executive core will be overturned by the 
statutory establishment of a policy located within the core.  
 
 35. Because regional directors are appointed by the IRS Commissioner and are under the 
direct supervision of the Deputy Commissioner, both of whom are appointees of the President 
subject to confirmation by the Senate, one can expect them to try to carry out the policy 
preferences of the President. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Thomas H. Hammond & Gary J. Miller, The Core of the Constitution, 81 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1155 (1987); Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the 
Bureaucracy? Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and 
Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J. LAW ECON. & 
ORG. 119 (1996). 
 37. See Hammond & Knott, supra note 36, at 128-32. Referring to Figure 1, if the 
President, P, is relatively extreme, one boundary of the legislative-executive core is defined by 
the median House member, Hm, or the median senator, Sm, whichever is furthest from the 
President. Id. The other boundary of the core is defined by the crucial veto-override legislator in 
the House, Hvo, or Senate, Svo, whichever is closer to the President. Id. For a liberal president, 
the 67th most liberal senator is the crucial veto override member in the Senate. The same logic 
applies in the House. Id. 
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Figure One 
 Liberal                      Conservative  
P Svo
Legislative-Executive Core
Executive Appointee Target
Hvo Hm Sm
 
 
P – President 
Hvo – 290th Most Liberal House Member (key veto override 
representative) 
Svo – 67th Most Liberal Senator (key veto override senator) 
Hm – Median Representative 
Sm – Median Senator 
In the case of executive agency appointees, the ability of the 
President to unilaterally fire and replace the appointee normally 
means that the appointee must act as a faithful agent of the President 
and his policies.38 Therefore, if the SOP model is accurate, agencies 
with executive appointees will establish policies within the boundary 
of the legislative-executive core closest to the President, and will 
shift its policies as the legislative-executive core shifts. We term this 
prediction the executive appointee target policy.39 Based on this 
logic, each regional director will establish a particular policy at 
exactly the same point in the legislative-executive core. However, 
this idea of regional homogeneity fails, as there is significant regional 
variation in agency policies.40  
 
 38. See Timothy P. Nokken & Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of 
President Appointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 91, 95-97 (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., Charles R. Shipan, Political Influence, Regulatory Regimes, and the FDA, 
Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society (1998) (on file with 
author) (confirming this dynamic for the Food and Drug Administration, based on time series 
analysis of the agency’s monitoring activities). 
 40. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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There are two plausible dynamics that might drive a regional 
agency director to vary his or her policy choices from the executive 
branch’s established target policy. First, a regional director may not 
serve as faithful agent of the President. If his or her policy preference 
lies within the legislative-executive core and he or she can avoid 
getting fired, a regional director may choose a policy other than the 
executive appointee target policy, thus, farther from the President’s 
preferred policy.41 Second, regional directors may be responsive to 
specific politicians who do not play a critical role in an SOP model. 
Appointed regional directors, for example, may be responsive to 
political pressures from their senatorial patrons, their local 
congressional representatives, or even state elected officials.42  
IV. REGIONAL COURT INFLUENCE AND BUREAUCRATIC 
POLICYMAKING 
Thus far, no formal treatment of SOP dynamics has modeled the 
impact of regional courts on agency policymaking. Furthermore, no 
empirical examination of SOP dynamics has recognized the 
possibility of politically relevant regional variation in agency 
behavior, despite clear evidence of regional variation within many 
agencies. 
Because the federal courts are regionally organized, they may 
induce regional variation in agency policy. Courts have been partially 
incorporated into one SOP model at the national level.43 This Article 
pursues a variant of that model, which recognizes that interaction 
with the bureaucracy primarily occurs at the regional level, in the 
 
 41. Principal-agent theory suggests that delegation of control is always imperfect. Terry 
M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance,’ 12 LEGIS. STUD. 
Q. 475 (1987). However, principal-agent dynamics addressing the President’s removal power 
over executive personnel has not been integrated into current SOP models, and we make no 
attempt to do so in this Article. Rather we assume IRS regional directors are faithful agents of 
the President. 
 42. See, e.g., Controlling the IRS, supra note 14; Efficiency, Equity, and Politics, supra 
note 10; Howard, supra note 5. For example, because IRS policies on audits may directly 
impact a state’s economy and its constituents, local politicians may put pressure on regional 
IRS directors to adopt audit policies favorable to their constituents. However, current SOP 
models of agency policy have not discussed this kind of responsiveness because all appointees 
in previous models have occupied national, rather than regional positions. 
 43. See Hammond & Knott, supra note 36, at 124-25. 
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federal courts of appeals. 
In Thomas Hammond and Jack Knott’s formulation, courts 
exogenously establish a “legal set” through an unmodeled decision-
making process.44 The legal set may or may not overlap with the 
legislative-executive core.45 If the legal set does not fully subsume 
the legislative-executive core, judicial review may present additional 
constraints on agency policy. If the boundary of the legislative-
executive core closest to the President falls outside of the legal set, 
even a faithful agent of the President will not establish a policy at that 
boundary because the policy may be overturned by the courts and 
substituted with court-ordered policy located anywhere within the 
legal set. As a result of this additional constraint, a regional director 
will establish a policy at the boundary of the legal set closest to the 
President that also lies within the legislative-executive core. Such a 
policy should survive any legislative efforts to overturn it, and it 
should also survive judicial review. Thus, this circuit-conscious 
executive appointee target policy represents the best policy the 
President can obtain.  
Figure Two 
P Hvo Svo Hm
    Legislative-Executive Core
Circuit-Conscious Executive Appointee Target Policy
Jm
Legal Set
Sm
Jm – Median judge on circuit 
One way to determine how a court of appeals establishes a range 
of permissible agency policy outcomes is to recognize that federal 
 
 44. Hammond & Knott, supra note 36, at 147-52. The legal set, much like the legislative-
executive core, is a range of policy outcomes permitted by the court(s). 
 45. Id. at 150-52. 
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courts of appeals typically hear cases in randomly assigned three-
judge panels.46 One may look at this random assignment like a 
combination problem.47 For example, consider Figure Three’s 
illustration of a hypothetical court of appeals with five judges, J1-5, 
whose ideological preferences are arrayed on a liberal-conservative 
scale. The median judge on this court is J3. 
Figure Three 
 
J1
Legal Set
J5J2 J3 J4  
 
As Table One indicates, there are ten distinct three-member panels 
possible. In this hypothetical circuit, both J2 and J4 are the median 
judges in three potential panels each. In four potential panels, the 
median judge is J3. Thus, the median judge on the court, J3, is more 
likely than any other judge to be the median judge on any given 
panel. Because the median judge on the court is most likely to be the 
median judge on any particular panel, variation in the ideology of the 
median court of appeals judge should be related to variation in 
regional agency policy. 
 
 46. Excluding the Federal Circuit, the Federal Courts of Appeals employ three-judge 
panels in over 99% of all administrative hearings. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To 
the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 
1018-20, Law Issue (1990). 
 47. For example, k judges serve on a court of appeals and 3 judges serve on a panel. Thus, 
there are (
3!3)(k
k!

) distinct panels.  
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Table One 
Three-member permutations for a five-member appellate court
Panel Members J1, J2, J3 
J1, J2, J4 
J1, J2, J5 
J1, J3, J4 
J1, J3, J5 
J2, J3, J5 
J2, J3, J4 
J1, J4, J5 
J2, J4, J5 
J3, J4, J5 
Panel Median J2 J3 J4 
 
The bounds of acceptable court of appeals policy might be 
thought of as the interval between J2 and J4. In this hypothetical court 
of appeals, no three-member panel will vote to uphold a policy 
outside of that range. The IRS could infer that this indicates the 
permissible range for policy preferences in that court of appeals. 
However, if each possible panel has an equal probability of 
assignment (1/10, in this example), then a specific panel may choose 
to overturn an agency policy, even if the agency establishes the 
policy within the court’s broad range of acceptable policy.48 Thus, a 
rational IRS official should establish policies based on a calculation 
of the lottery among all possible panels. Specifically, the IRS should 
randomize its policy choices to meet the preferences of J2, J3, and J4, 
with probabilities .3, .4, and .3, respectively, because the probabilities 
of having J2, J3, or J4 as the median judge on a panel are .3, .4, and .3, 
respectively.49 
 
 48. For example, if the IRS establishes a policy at J2, but draws a panel composed of J3, J4, 
and J5, the IRS policy is vulnerable to a judicial reversal. 
 49. However, one cannot observe randomizing behavior, one can only observe the specific 
policy choices the IRS establishes in each circuit. 
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V. HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND MEASURING IDEOLOGY  
Congress micromanages the IRS to a greater extent than many 
other regulatory agencies.50 Nevertheless, the agency possesses 
considerable discretion in its enforcement actions.51 No single 
discretionary action at the IRS generates more numerous or more 
intense constituent complaints than the audit. The agency uses a 
number of secret formulas52 to select taxpayers for audits, and 
adjustments to those formulas differentially affect different taxpayer 
income classes.53 Moreover, the degree to which audits focus on 
businesses or individuals is politically relevant to competing concerns 
of equity and efficiency.  
A. Hypotheses 
Looking for regional court control over the audit ratio within an 
SOP framework, we derived the following hypotheses: 
1. As the median ideology of a federal court of appeals moves 
in a liberal direction, the IRS director in the court’s region will 
increase the number of business audits. 
2. As the ideology of the executive—legislative core moves in 
a liberal direction, the IRS will increase the number of 
business audits. 
B. Data 
Relying on a dataset of IRS audits,54 we designed a model suitable 
for testing the impact of federal courts of appeals’s ideologies on IRS 
audit policy in an SOP framework that allows for regional variation. 
The dataset we constructed features an annual ratio of the total 
number of individual tax return audits over the total number of 
 
 50. See BURNHAM, supra note 8, at 238-40. 
 51. See LONG, supra note 8, at 131-48. 
 52. The best known is the Discriminate Income Function (DIF). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Efficiency, Equity, and Politics, supra note 10, at 1175-79. 
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business tax return audits in each state from 1960 to 1988 (n=1350).55 
This ratio increased when the IRS shifted audit attention away from 
business taxpayers, toward individual taxpayers.56 Following the 
approach used by Scholz and Wood,57 and Howard and Nixon,58 we 
examine state variation for this study.  
We use two control variables to account for alternative, but 
potentially correlated explanations: (1) State per capita income; and 
(2) Local government ideology. The first is a measure of state wealth; 
one should expect greater individual audits in wealthier states and in 
states with lower employment rates.59 The second is a measure of the 
proportion of Democratic representatives in the state legislature and 
Democratic control of the Governor’s office,60 and has been used in 
previous studies of IRS audit policy.61 
Our key independent variables are measures of political ideology 
for courts, Congress, and the President. All of our ideology indicators 
are based on a version of NOMINATE scores, which indicate 
preferences along the traditional liberal-conservative dimension of 
American politics, and have been employed extensively in political 
science literature as measures of policy preferences. We focused on 
first-dimension “common space” W-NOMINATE scores derived by 
Keith Poole,62 because they are unusually useful in that the scores are 
comparable across institutions and time.63 Our analysis goes further 
 
 55. Data on the IRS, including audit rates, are available by state, district office, and 
region. Data was not available for 1970 and 1971, thus we were not able to include data from 
those years in our analyses.  
 56. There was a slight change in the business and individual audit categories after 1980. 
However, the business and individual ratios should not be affected by this change. 
 57. See Controlling the IRS, supra note 14; Efficiency, Equity, and Politics, supra note 10. 
 58. Howard & Nixon, supra note 5. 
 59. See Efficiency, Equity, and Politics, supra note 10, at 1175; Howard & Nixon, supra 
note 5, at 913. 
 60. See William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the 
American States, 1960-93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 332-34 (1998). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 954 (1998). These scores indicate economic conservatism of all presidents and members of 
Congress since 1938, ranging continuously from -1.0 (most liberal) to +1.0 (most conservative). 
The scores are static in that an individual is assumed to maintain the same ideology for the 
duration of his or her career. Keith T. Poole, Changing Minds? Not in Congress!, Gsia Working 
Paper #1997-22 (1998). 
 63. For example, it is legitimate to claim that a Representative serving in 1942 with a 
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by extending Poole’s first dimension “common space” W-
NOMINATE scores to the judges of the federal courts of appeals.  
To allow a test for the influence of Congress and the President, we 
employed Poole’s NOMINATE scores to construct a “core” variable. 
This variable indicates the ideal point in the common-space W-
NOMINATE scale of the pivotal veto override member in the 
Congress.64 To allow a test for the influence of the federal courts of 
appeals, we constructed indictors for the central tendency and scope 
of preferences in each federal court of appeals each year. We 
hypothesize that regional IRS directors respond to pressures from the 
federal court of appeals judicial authorities in their region, as well as 
to pressures from Congress and the President. 
C. Measuring Judicial Ideology 
Unlike the Supreme Court,65 there is no generally accepted 
measure of lower court ideology that is strictly comparable across 
institutions and time.66 Scholars often employ a judge’s partisan 
affiliation as a surrogate for judicial attitudes.67 However, focusing on 
partisanship of judges restricts possible ideology indicators to one of 
two values, which fails to account for the subtlety and diversity of 
attitudes on the bench. Some scholars occasionally ignore a judge’s 
personal ideology by inferring his or her ideology from the 
 
score of .20 is more conservative than a Senator serving in 1969 with a score of .19, and that a 
President serving in 1972 with a score of .43 is substantially more conservative than either the 
Representative or Senator. 
 64. See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS (1998). 
 65. Segal and Cover derived ideological scores for Justices through a content analysis of 
four newspapers—the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post and the Los 
Angeles Times—at the time of the appointment of each new Justice. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert 
D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 557, 560 (1989). The scores range from –1.0 to +1.0 as the ideology is calculated from the 
most conservative to the most liberal. Id. The coding starts with the appointment of Earl Warren 
and ranges from a -1.0 for Justice Scalia to a +1.0 for Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. A 
complete listing can be found in the SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra 
note 13. 
 66. See, e.g., Tim Groseclose et al., Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and 
Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33 (1999). 
 67. The party of each judge that has served in one of the modern circuits is available in 
the Appellate Biographical Database. See Gary Zuk et al., Appellate Biographical Database, 
National Science Foundation SBR 93-11999 (1997). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p233 Howard.doc  9/11/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
248 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:233 
 
appointing President, which also fails to capture the diversity of 
judicial attitudes.68 A number of scholars suggest determining judicial 
ideology by combining existing measures of ideology.69 However, 
these measures often lack significant variation, and it is impossible to 
compare these ideologies to the ideologies of legislators and 
presidents.  
We use a predictive approach to data collected by Nixon,70 and 
propose a measure of the personal ideology of each federal court of 
appeals judge that is strictly comparable to Poole’s common-space 
W-NOMINATE scores.71 We extended Nixon’s data by assembling 
data on all 63 federal judicial appointees who also served in 
 
 68. For example, Tate and Handberg proposed an ordinal measure of the ideology of the 
appointing president: -1 for ideologically conservative presidents, 0 for nonideological 
presidents, and 1 for ideologically liberal presidents. See C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time 
Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 
1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460, 466 (1991). This measure may be attributed to every judge 
on the circuits, but the data range is not much better with only three possible values of ideology.
Segal, Timpone and Howard improved on the Tate and Handberg ranking of presidential 
ideology by surveying presidential scholars and establishing an interval scale for each president 
since Franklin Roosevelt. Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware? Presidential Influence 
Through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557, 561 (2000). Segal, Timpone and 
Howard’s economic liberalism scores for judges ranged from 17.6 (appointees of Reagan, the 
most conservative president) to 82.5 (appointees of Franklin Roosevelt, the most liberal 
president). Id. at 562. Using this approach, the data range for judges’ ideology is at least 
theoretically better. However, no rankings are available for presidents or their appointees prior 
to Franklin Roosevelt, and all judges appointed by the same president receive the same score. 
Id. at 560-62. Giles et al., modified this approach by ascribing to each judge Poole’s 
NOMINATE indicators for the judge’s appointing president or sponsoring senator. Michael 
Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. 
RES. Q. 623, 631 (2001). However, the approach does not distinguish between different judges 
appointed by the same president.  
 69. For example, Songer has constructed a more differentiated measure of judicial 
ideology based on a logit analysis of judicial voting in economic cases, with a North/South 
dummy and the Tate/Handberg measure of the appointing president’s ideology as predictors. 
The scores range from 0 (conservative) to 1 (liberal) and can be computed for every appellate 
judge ever serving on the modern circuit bench. Id. at 212. Humphries and Songer also 
computed social liberalism scores. Id. In practice, judges are assigned only one of six possible 
scores, and it is impossible to make direct comparisons with congressional and executive 
ideology. 
 70. David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers Constraints on Appointee Ideology, J.L. ECON. 
& ORG (forthcoming). Nixon assembled a data on 95 executive appointees who also served in 
Congress. Id. He demonstrated that SOP considerations at the time of these executive 
appointees predicated their first-dimension common-space W-NOMINATE scores. Id. 
 71. See Poole, supra note 62. 
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Congress.72 The predictive model presented in Table Two, is the 
basis for our measure of judicial ideology. It is based on factors one 
can identify for any federal judge. The predicted scores from this 
model tend to range from -.5 (liberal) to +.5 (conservative), and are 
quite finely differentiated, based on the political circumstances 
surrounding the judge’s appointment. 
Table Two 
OLS Model of Judicial Ideology. Dependent Variable: Poole’s 
common space W-nominate scores. Sample: 63 federal judges who 
have served in one of the 75th -105th Congresses 
Independent Variables coefficients 
Constant -.0306 
Judge’s own Party (-1 democrat, 0 independent, +1 republican) .2371 
Appointing President’s Party (-1 democrat, +1 republican) .0448 
Unified Government at time of Appointment (0 - no, 1 - yes)* .0249 
Wartime Appointment (0 - no, 1 - yes) .0694 
Southern Democrat (0 - no, 1 – yes) .1285 
Northeastern Republican (0 - no, 1 - yes) -.0151 
State Ideology73 .3999 
R2 .750 
* In positive values for Republican presidents, negative values 
for Democratic presidents 
 
 
 72. Additional judges have served in Congress, but Poole’s ideology measures are 
available only for presidents and members of Congress elected after 1938. 
 73. State ideology is based on unweighted scores computed by Wright et al. See Gerald C. 
Wright et al., Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data, 47 J. POL. 469 
(1985). 
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Our measure of a judge’s ideology, scaled in first-dimension 
“common-space” W-NOMINATE metric, is based on the linear 
equation implied by Table Two.74 Once additional variables are 
included, the two primary determinants of judicial ideology (SOP 
constraints and senatorial courtesy) make no significant contribution 
to the model (F2,54=2.8, n.s.). This occurs because the independent 
variables serve as surrogates for SOP constraints and senatorial 
courtesy.75 These static scores provide substantial differentiation 
between judges. Because these scores are scaled in the same issue 
space and on the same metric as the first dimension of Poole’s 
common-space W-NOMINATE scores, it is possible to make relative 
comparisons across time and institutional settings.76  
Admittedly, there is a potential problem with using these 
ideological economic liberalism scores. To date, the literature has not 
shown that ideological voting and voting in favor of or against the 
IRS, is concordant.77 However, by using Songer’s United States 
Court of Appeals Database78 it is possible to examine the voting 
record of the individual courts of appeals judges who voted on civil 
cases involving the IRS during the period of our study. Although the 
IRS audits a greater number of individual taxpayers than 
businesses,79 given the expense of both filing lawsuits and appealing 
to one of the federal courts of appeals, business organizations bring a 
far greater percentage of appeals challenging the IRS than do 
individuals. Thus, we expect the mean level of support for the IRS to 
be higher the more liberal the judge and lower the more conservative 
 
 74. Judge’s ideology = -.0306 + (.2371 * judge’s own party) + (.0448 * party of judge’s 
appointing president) + (.0249 * unified government at time of judge’s appointment + (.0649 * 
war at time of judge’s appointment) + (.1285 * judge is a southern democrat) – (.0151 * judge 
is a northeastern republican) + (.3999 * ideology of judge’s home state). 
 75. The partisanship of the judge and the partisanship of the President are surrogates for 
SOP constraints. The state ideology, and whether a judge was supported by a southern democrat 
or a northeastern republican are surrogates for senatorial courtesy.  
 76. For example, a researcher could legitimately claim that if judge A, appointed in 1962, 
has an ideology of .3, and President B elected in 1972, has an ideology of .31, the judge is 
slightly less conservative than the President. 
 77. The very liberal Justice William O. Douglas is a well-known counter example. 
Douglas was an opponent of the IRS, usually voting against the government in tax cases. 
 78. Donald D. Songer, The United States Courts of Appeals Database, National Science 
Foundation SES #8912678. 
 79. In this dataset the ratio of individual to business audits was close to six to one. 
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the judge.  
There is a relationship between this study’s judicial ideology 
measure and judicial votes in favor of and against the IRS. Using the 
coding from the Songer database, we derived mean levels of support 
for the IRS for each court of appeals judge. We then compared these 
levels of support for the IRS to the Nixon measure of judicial 
ideology.80 We calculated the Pearson correlation between Nixon’s 
ideology score and the mean support for the IRS for each of the 219 
judges for whom we could identify both of these factors. The 
correlation is .22 and significantly different from zero at the .001 
level, which indicates a positive association between higher 
economic liberalism and support for the IRS. Conversely, the lower 
the economic liberalism score of a judge, the more likely it is that that 
judge will support a business over the IRS. 
VI. AN SOP MODEL OF REGIONAL VARIATION IN AUDIT POLICY 
We determined the judicial ideology score for each judge on each 
federal court of appeals and then identified the median ideology for 
each federal court of appeals each year. If national policymaking 
conditions are adequate to explain IRS policy choices, then variation 
among states will be unrelated to policy preference of the federal 
courts of appeals. On the other hand, if national policymaking 
conditions do not adequately explain IRS policy choices, it is 
plausible to suggest that the IRS deviates from their executive 
appointee target policy by adopting policies closer to the median 
federal courts of appeals judicial ideology, to avoid being overturned.  
A. Methodology 
The data used for this study is cross-sectional time-series data, or 
panel data. The structure of this data makes the use of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) problematic since one cannot assume that all the 
errors will be uncomplicated or “spherical.”81 There is the potential 
 
 80. See supra note 70. 
 81. See, e.g., Nathaniel Beck & Jonathan N. Katz, What To Do (and Not To Do) with 
Time-Series Cross-Section Data, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 634-36 (1995); WILLIAM H. GREEN, 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1997). 
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for auto/serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
Because states are different sizes, using a ratio for the dependent 
variable reduces the risk of heteroscedasticity.82 Because audit rates 
have declined over time, the use of a ratio also reduces the risk of 
other methodological problems associated with longitudinal studies, 
such as non-stationarity. Inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
controls for autocorrelation of the residuals.83 Finally, we use cross-
sectional time series data with corrections for standard errors.84 The 
results are reported as regression coefficients. 
Table Three 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Audit Ratio 
 
5.92 3.32 
Median Nixon 
Ideology Score 
 
-.021 .099 
Core Boundary 
 
-.04 .23 
Per Capita Income 
 
13769 4023 
Local Government 48.77 23.66 
 
 82. We searched for heteroscedasticity by graphing the estimated squared residuals, ui2, 
against the estimated Yi, and against several of the explanatory variables. We also performed 
White’s general heteroscedasticity test on the reduced form and final equations. See GREENE, 
supra note 81, at 550. The chi squared values obtained were all below the critical chi square 
value at the .05 level of significance.  
 83. We also tested for autocorrelation. Because the Durbin-Watson test is not a valid test 
in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, we used a modification of the Bruesch-Godfrey 
test suggested by Greene. See GREENE, supra note 81, at 596. This test indicated no significant 
evidence of autocorrelation. 
 84. See Beck & Katz, supra note 81. 
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We tested our hypotheses using our panel design based on a 
regression equation,85 taking into account all the predictors. The 
results, presented in Table Four, support our hypotheses. Given the 
scale of these measures, the directions of the coefficients are also as 
hypothesized. As a federal court of appeals becomes more liberal, the 
audit rate of individuals decreases. As the legislative–executive core 
boundary shifts in a more liberal direction, the audit rate of 
individuals will also decrease. The results also indicate that federal 
courts of appeals ideology is a greater determinant of the regional 
variation in IRS audits rates than is the legislative-executive core. 
When controlling for the court’s ideology, the coefficient for the 
legislative–executive core is 1.63. Substantively, this means that a 
standard deviation shift of the legislative-executive core in a more 
liberal direction translates into a positive shift of .37 for the ratio of 
business to individual audits, which is a smaller effect than that of the 
federal courts of appeals. 
As expected, the data indicates that IRS altered the audit ratio in 
response to the policy preferences of the median federal courts of 
appeals judge.86 Because the predictors are measured in the identical 
metric, describing the effect of judicial ideology on IRS audits is 
strictly comparable to the coefficient describing the effect of the 
legislative-executive core. If the core shifts by .25 in a conservative 
direction, the ratio of individual to business audits shifts upward by 
.4. If the median federal court of appeals judge shifts in a 
conservative direction by .25, the ratio of individual to business 
audits shifts upward by 1.98.87  
 
 85. Yt (Audit Ratio) = 1 (Court Median Ideology) + 2 (Core Boundary) + 3 (Local 
Government) + 4 (Per Capita Income) + 5 (Yt – 1) (Lag Audit Ratio) + . 
 86. As the median ideology moved in a liberal direction, a greater percentage of wealthy 
taxpayers were audited. As the median ideology moved in a conservative direction, the IRS 
audited more low-income tax returns. 
 87. This impact is almost five times larger than the affect of Congress and the President. 
In actuality, such a dramatic ideology shift on the appellate bench is uncommon, except over 
long periods of time. 
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The per capita income coefficient failed to achieve statistical 
significance. The local government ideology measure showed some 
influence, although the effect of a 2.0 standard deviation shift was 
extremely small (.004).  
Table Four 
Regional vs. National Influence: IRS Audit Ratio  
Independent Variable 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Court Ideology 
 
7.90***  
(2.39) 
Core Boundary 
 
1.63** 
(.64) 
Local Government 
 
.01* 
(.005) 
Per Capita Income 
 
.00004 
(.00003) 
Audit Ratio Lag .15*** 
(.04) 
Constant 5.39*** 
(.58) 
R2 .18 
Chi2 111.82*** 
  
N= 1350 
 * = p<.05 (two tailed) 
 ** = p<.01 (two tailed) 
*** = p<.001 (two tailed) 
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VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study had two purposes. One was to examine the assertion of 
many scholars, journalists, and citizens that the IRS has wide 
discretion and lacks political control; this study sought to determine if 
the IRS operates within an SOP framework at lower levels of agency 
hierarchy. The other purpose was to analyze the interplay between 
federal courts of appeals ideology measures and IRS audit ratios. 
To answer these questions, this study examined regional variation 
in audits between individuals and businesses. The very existence of 
regional variation in IRS audit behavior is considered evidence of the 
lack of political control over the agency. Additionally, because IRS 
decisions are technically complex there is an information asymmetry 
between IRS bureaucrats and the political powers seeking to oversee 
IRS decisions.  
While others have shown that partisan political change has an 
impact on IRS audit behavior,88 this Article expanded the scope of 
the inquiry to consider how oversight exercised by the federal courts 
of appeals operates within a national SOP framework. The results 
suggest that ideological changes in the national executive and 
legislative branches, together with ideological changes in regional 
federal courts of appeals can influence IRS audit behavior. These 
results indicate that regional variation in IRS policy may not be a 
consequence of an agency out of control or of an agency exploiting 
information asymmetries, but is the result of different regional 
political and judicial ideologies that regional IRS policy makers 
confront. 
Clearly there is still significant unexplained variation. 
Undoubtedly the IRS, like all agencies, has its own set of 
“pathologies.” It appears, however, that the IRS responds to national, 
as well as regional, control, indicating, perhaps, that fears of 
unfettered bureaucracies undermining democratic governance are 
unfounded. 
Through our measure of the ideology of federal courts of appeals 
judges, this study was able to discern the difference in influence 
 
 88. See, e.g., Controlling the IRS, supra note 14; Efficiency, Equity, and Politics, supra 
note 10; Howard & Nixon, supra note 5. 
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between federal courts of appeals and national political control. Our 
analysis demonstrates that ideological shifts in federal courts of 
appeals have an almost five times greater impact on IRS audit 
behavior than do shifts in national executive ideology. While these 
shifts in court ideology take place over a much longer period of time 
than national executive shifts, the analysis shows that the regional 
autonomy and variance that resulted from IRS scandals of the 1950s89 
did result in local IRS officials paying greater attention to local 
conditions than they did to national conditions.  
 
 89. See Controlling the IRS, supra note 14, at n.2. 
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